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Abstract
Group signature is an extension of digital signature, which allows a group member
to sign anonymously a document on behalf of the group. Any client can verify
the authenticity of the document by using the public parameters of the group.
The identity of the group member cannot be revealed from the group signature.
In case of a legal dispute, an authorized group member can disclose the identity
of the group member from the signed document. Group signature can have wide
application to corporate world, banks, and e-commerce applications.
In this thesis, we designed a group signature protocol based upon hard computa-
tional assumptions such as, Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), Integer Factor-
ization Problem (IFP), and Computational Diffie Hellmann (CDH) problem. The
proposed scheme is proved to be resistant against colluding attack. Moreover, the
group signature remains valid, if some members leave the group or some new mem-
bers join the group. Full traceability feature is confirmed in the proposed scheme.
The scheme can have wide applications in real life scenarios such as e-banking,
e-voting, and e-commerce applications.
Keywords: anonymity; colluding attack; discrete logarithm; group signature; unforgeability
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Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for providing the authenticity of a
digital information or document. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason
to believe that the information was given by a known sender, such that the sender
cannot deny having sent the message and that the message was not altered in
transit. Digital signatures are basically applied for software distribution, financial
transactions, and in cases of disputes where it is important to detect forgery or
tampering of digital information. Extending the idea of digital signature into
the group, a new signature scheme i.e. group signature scheme, first introduced
by Chaum and Heyst, allows a group member to sign messages anonymously on
behalf of the group [11]. Any client can verify the authenticity of the signature
by using only the group’s public key and parameters. The identity of the group
member cannot be linked from a signed message. In the case of a dispute, the
identity of a signer or member can be revealed by a designated entity. The main
feature of group signature is the security of the information or the data that makes
it more important and attractive for many real time applications, such as e-cash,
e-bidding and e-commerce, where the priority of privacy and anonymity of signer
is very much high and important for an organization.
Following the first schemes proposed by Chaum, a number of group signature
schemes have been proposed. Chen and Pedersen constructed a scheme, which
allows new members to join the group dynamically, and suggested to use group
signatures in e-bidding[2]. Camenisch and Stadler proposed the first group sig-
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nature scheme that can beused for large groups, since in their scheme the group
public key and signatures have lengths independent of the group size [4]. Later,
Kim et al. extended their scheme to support efficient member revocation. Ate-
niese and Tsudik pointed out some obstacles that stand in the way of real world
applications of group signatures, such as coalition attacks and member deletion
[13].
In the literature,we observed that at present these group signature schemes
available are mainly classified into two types, a public-key registration type, and
a certificate-based type. In the former type, [7,25] are constructed by using only
known-order groups. However, in these schemes, both a group public key and
the signature size depend on the number of group members. It yields a serious
problem for large groups. In the latter type, give a membership certificate to
group members, and the group signature is based on the zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge (SPK) of membership certificate. Therefore, neither a group public key
nor signature size depends on the number of group members.
1.1 Basic Concepts and Requirement Of Group
Signature
A group signature scheme is a technique of signing the documents or any relevant
information anonymously on behalf of group, where group consist of manager and
various designated members shown in Figure 1.1. The integrity of sign is verified
by the designated verifier, where the verifier is aware of the correctness of the sign
not the identity of member who signed the documents etc. The concept of group
signature was first proposed by Chaum and Heyst that allows any member of a
group to sign message on behalf of a group. According to the Chaum and Heyst,
the group signature must include following policies.
 Group members are only role person to sign the messages.
 The integrity of the signature should be checked without revealing the iden-
tity of the signer.
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 If necessary, the signature can be opened to reveal the identity of signer.
In group signature schemes, group manager is the only person capable of addition
of the members and removing of the members from the group. In case of legal dis-
putes, if any, then manager is responsible in revealing the identity of the signer or
member who signed. However, a standard group signature scheme have following
five phases[18]:
 System setup: the setup includes key generation mechanism, where the group
manager’s key and group public key and secret keys for members with some
essential parameters is necessary.
 Join: this phase includes joining of members in the group where the user or
member receives the membership certificate and secret key from the group
manager.
 Sign: this phase performs the signature generation on behalf of the group.
 Verify: this phase includes verification of signature via group’s public key
on behalf of the group
 Open: this phase is additional vital phase where the identity of signer can
be revealed by the group manager, if necessary.
Figure 1.1: Layout of standard group signature system
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In literature, we found that the responsibility of adding members and revoking sig-
nature anonymity are separated and assigned to two distinguished persons namely,
membership manager and revocation manager. The basic security requirements
of a standard group signature are given below:
 Soundness or correctness: Valid signatures by group members always verify
correctly, and invalid signatures always fail verification.
 Anonymity: for a message and its signature, the identity of the individual
signer cannot be revealed without the group manager’s secret key.
 Unforgeablility: Only members of the group can create valid group signa-
tures and otherwise signature is considered to be invalid.
 Unlinkability: for certain messages and their signatures, we cannot deter-
mine if the signatures were from the same signer or not.
 Exculpability: If group members collude, then it must be impossible to forge
a signature for a non-participating group member.
1.2 Colluding Attack in Group Signature
1.2.1 Defining Collusion
Collusion as the name suggest is a act of cooperation between two person or set
of person for the sake of achieving mainly the illegal benefits. Collusion is a very
common and risky problem to be faced in every field which cannot be controlled
easily as the unpredictable nature of attack can observed in figure below. So if we
generalize the nature, we can state the collusion, as a agreement between two or
more parties, sometimes illegal and therefore secretive, to limit open competition
by deceiving, misleading, or defrauding others of their legal rights, or to obtain an
objective forbidden by law typically by defrauding or gaining an unfair advantage.
It is an agreement among firms or individuals to divide a market, set prices, limit
production or limit opportunities. In other words collusion attack can be described
as an action carried out by a given set of malicious users in possession of a copy
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of protected content that join together in order to obtain at the end of the attack
procedure an unprotected asset. The attack is carried out by properly combining
the protected copies of the multimedia documents collected by the collude rs,
according to the type of content and the kind of adopted protection system.
Figure 1.2: Scenario of collusion attack
1.2.2 Roles under The Colluding Attack
The Colluding attack has another flavor with small variation ie stated as coali-
tion.The coalition can be thought of subpart of collusion where a set of member
collide to achieve the respective objective.Coalition is another security threat ba-
sically discussed with respect to the group. so if we consider the security part for
collusion, then coalition can be avoided.In general, the group signature involves
the group manager who is responsible in distributing many security parameter be-
tween members, which is a very critical role where collusion is possible, secondly
the group member who are responsible in signing the documents can also collude
which makes the member very critical issue and finally the verifier who is respon-
sible for verifying the signature in the document can also collude which can create
a threat to the integrity of the document.Above all discussed roles were involved
in the system, but a non group member or a set of non group members can also
collude with the group member which can be huge threat to the real time system.
So to avoid or to resist the colluding attack one must consider all possible roles
6
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in the system, but one can avoid this attack up to a certain limit because of the
unpredictable nature of different roles in system of secure communication.
1.2.3 Consequences of Colluding Attack
The group signature is extended idea of digital signature with some stringent
condition from which the resistance against colluding attack is one of the critical
issues in group signature.The whole strength of secure system lies in the trust
and security parameters used in the system, So considering the consequences of
colluding attack, if collusion is possible then the signature can be easily forged
crashing whole system of signing the document thus a threat to the security of
digital information or message.
1.3 Application of Group Signature
1.3.1 Voting System
E-voting also known as electronic voting collectively means to cast vote and count
the votes electronically. E-voting is physically supervised by representatives of
governmental or independent electoral authorities where group signature would
be beneficial. Voting is also performed within the voter’s sole influence, and is
not physically supervised by representatives of governmental authorities where
the authorization plays a vital role as trusted party is needed to govern the voting
scheme, in such case group signature can be best applicable.
1.3.2 Sales and Bidding System
Electronic commerce, commonly known as e-commerce, is a type of industry where
buying and selling of product or service is conducted over electronic systems such
as the Internet and other computer networks. It consists of the exchange of data
to facilitate the financing and payment aspects of business transactions. Group
signature is effective and efficient way of providing security in communicating
within an organization.
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1.3.3 Corporate Organisation
Any organisation well developed consist of many roles working for the particular
objective to be achieved which comprises of vital information to be shared between
them, thus group signature proves to be efficient way to authorise the information
among everyone and saving the valuable time with a reliable approach.
1.4 Motivation and Objective
We are very much aware of digital signature and its benefits regarding the security
of information, so extending the idea of digital signature into group where multiple
documents or information can be authorised in parallel and time saving system.
The group signature was introduced in early 90’s but idea of setting a secure group
system became very challenging as the condition were very stringent as compared
to digital signature but if this is achieved can be effective in this fast developing
digital era. The proposed work is motivated from the previous scheme developed
where collusion resistant was not a centralised idea of securing the information or
documents, thus a safe and secure group signature scheme where all the condition
can be efficiently satisfied and providing better security, performance compared to
other group signature schemes.
1.5 Problem Statement
The Objective of thesis is to design a group signature scheme based on following
assumptions:
1. Group signature scheme based upon hard computational assumptions, such
as, discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and computational Diffie Hellmann
(CDH) problem.
2. Group signature scheme must be unaffected by joining or leaving of any
member.
8
1.6 Organization of Thesis
3. Group signature scheme must be resistant against colluding attack, which
enhances unforgery against compromised group of members.
4. Group signature scheme must satisfy security features such as anonymity,
traceability, and unlinkability.
1.6 Organization of Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows,Chapter 2 gives a brief introduction of prelimi-
nary of thesis. The proposed scheme is described in Chapter 3. Security analysis
and performance evaluation of proposed scheme is done in Chapter 4. Discussion
about implementation and result is depicted in Chapter 5. Finally we conclude
with future work in Chapter 6.
9
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Chapter 2
Literature Survey
In this section, we reviewed the literature related to various group signature
schemes and their security features. First, we give a brief overview of cryptog-
raphy concepts then preliminaries related to discrete logarithms, hash functions,
random number generations, and prime number with primality test. Later, we
reviewed some popular group signature schemes based on security features.
2.1 Cryptography Concepts and Signature Re-
quirements
Cryptography can be defined as protecting information by transforming into an
unreadable format, called cipher text. Only those who possess a secret key can
decipher the message into plain text. Encrypted messages can sometimes be bro-
ken by cryptanalysis, also called code breaking, although modern cryptography
techniques are virtually unbreakable. Cryptography systems can be broadly clas-
sified into symmetric-key systems that use a single key that both the sender and
recipient have, and systems that use two keys, a public key known to everyone and
a private key that only the recipient of messages uses, but in case of the signature
needs a public key system where the signer signs with private key and the verifier
verifies with the signer’s public key.
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2.1.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
Discrete logarithms are logarithms defined with regard to multiplicative cyclic
groups[30]. If G is a multiplicative cyclic group and g is a generator of G , then
from the definition of cyclic groups, we know every element h in G can be written
as gx for some x. The discrete logarithm to the base g of h in the group G is
defined to be x. The discrete logarithm problem is defined as: given a group G , a
generator g of the group and an element h of G , to find the discrete logarithm to
the base g of h in the group G . Discrete logarithm problem is not always hard.
The hardness of finding discrete logarithms depends on the groups.Mathematically
DLP can be given as:
Let a, b, n be positive real numbers, such that
logb(a) = n, if and only if a = b
n (2.1)
The logb function solves the following problem: Given a base b and a power a of
b , find an exponent n such that a = bn .That is, given bn and b , find n .
2.1.2 Cryptographic Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function is hash function that converts arbitrary block of
information and provides a fixed size string where each data is mapped such that
any change would vary the value of hash with very high probability[31]. The
information to be encoded is known to be the message and the hash value obtained
is called the message digest or digest. Ideally the hash function must follow certain
properties, firstly should be easy to compute the hash value for given message and
at the same time must be infeasible to generate a message with a random hash and
also be resistant against modify a message without the hash.We may come across
a long list of cryptographic hash functions, although many have been found to be
vulnerable and should not be used. Considering the integrity of information we
may use hash function such as SHA 1, MD2, MD4 and MD5 where each scheme
can be used to provide a digest of respective bits depending on the requirement
of message or information integrity.
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2.1.3 Random Number Generator
A random number generator is a computational device designed to generate a
sequence of numbers that lack any pattern, i.e. appear random[32]. The many
applications of randomness have led to the development of several different meth-
ods for generating random data.Random number generators are very useful in
developing Monte Carlo-method simulations, as debugging is facilitated by the
ability to run the same sequence of random numbers again by starting from the
same random seed. They are also used in cryptography - so long as the seed is
secret. Sender and receiver can generate the same set of numbers automatically
to use as keys.There are two principal methods used to generate random num-
bers. One measures some physical phenomenon that is expected to be random
and then compensates for possible biases in the measurement process. The other
uses computational algorithms that can produce long sequences of apparently ran-
dom results, which are in fact completely determined by a shorter initial value,
known as a seed or key. The latter type is often called pseudorandom number
generators.
2.1.4 Prime Numbers and Primality Test
A primality test is an algorithm for determining whether an input number is
prime. Amongst other fields of mathematics, it is used for cryptography[35]. Un-
like integer factorization, primality tests do not generally give prime factors, only
stating whether the input number is prime or not. Factorization is thought to be
a computationally difficult problem, whereas primality testing is comparatively
easy.Primality tests can be classified in two varieties: deterministic and proba-
bilistic.
Deterministic Algorithm: A deterministic primality testing algorithm accepts an
integer and always outputs a prime or a composite. Deterministic tests determine
with absolutecertainty whether a number is prime. Until recently, all determin-
istic algorithms were so insufficient at finding larger primes that they were con-
sidered infeasible. In 2002, Agrawal, Kayal and Saxena announced that that they
had found an algorithm for primality testing with polynomial time complexity of
13
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O((log 12n)) .
Probabilistic Algorithm: Probabilistic tests can potentially (although with verys-
mall probability) falsely identify a composite number as prime .However, they
are in general much faster than deterministic tests. Numbers that have passed a
probabilistic prime test are therefore properly referred to as probable primes until
their primality can be demonstrated deterministically.
2.2 Classification of group signature schemes
The classification of group signature protocol can be described in four types ,firstly
Static Group signature, secondly dynamic group signature with revocation, thirdly
group signature scheme with verifiable opening with the consideration of PKI
explicitly and finally group signature scheme where group manager can be dis-
tributed among different role. The basic functionality of this classification follows
the standard group signature scheme as generation of secret and public keys, gen-
erating the group key, signature generation from group, designated verification
and opening of group signature.
2.2.1 Static Group Signature
Static group signatures consist of four polynomial time algorithm[27] namely key
generation where system generates group public key with the secret key generation
for signing of document, Signature generation algorithm where it takes the secret
key and the information for signing and returns the signed document, Signature
verification algorithm where it takes the group public key, the signature with
the message and returns the value as accepted or rejected, finally the opening
algorithm where it takes group managers secret key, message and the signature
and reveals the identity of group member who signed. In general, the static group
signature determines all the parameters initially with the group member in the
group and also revocation is possible only through removing of member but no
addition of member allowed.
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2.2.2 Dynamic Group Signature
Dynamic group signature [22] as the name suggests the randomness and non-
deterministic nature of scheme. The dynamic group signature consist of five poly-
nomial algorithm namely signature key parameter generation where public param-
eters and secret of member is determined with a new list generated which keeps
the track of group member registration, join protocol where it computes the two
algorithm, firstly registering the member into the registration list and secondly
generating the member parameters for signing, Signature generation algorithm
where it takes the message with the group members secret key and generates sig-
nature, Signature verification algorithm which is a deterministic algorithm where
it takes message ,group public key and signature generated from group and outputs
the validity of signature. Finally the opening algorithm of signature where it takes
message, signature from group and registration list which will reveal the identity
of member in case of dispute. The difference between the static and dynamic
group signature is the addition of join phase where it provides the full revocation
as member can be added or removed depending on the choice of member in a
group.
2.2.3 Group Signature with Verifiable Opening
The distinguished property of signature is to preserve signers anonymity, yet allow
the manager to reveal the identity in legal dispute through the open procedure.
The group signature with verifiable opening has five polynomial algorithm as the
dynamic group signature but the difference here comes in the open procedure,
where the algorithm is divided into two procedure i.e. opening procedure and
the judging procedure. The basic functionality of group signature does not allow
the manager to falsely accuse the member in case of dispute, thus to assure the
validity of managers decision, manager has to provide additional proof against the
member. The opening algorithm can be given as; opening procedure that takes the
managers secret key with the message and the signature from the group and out-
puts the identity if accused with proof. In judgement procedure, algorithm takes
the proof and signature and reveals the validity of managers signature proving to
15
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be verifiably open procedure.
2.2.4 Group Signature with Distributed Roles
Group signature includes the group manager, who is responsible for many roles
in the signature procedure. The manager is concerned with mainly two tasks i.e.
the member ship in group and the opening of signature, these two tasks can be
distributed among two authorities as the issuer and the opener as distributed roles
of manager. The group signature scheme consist of basic polynomial algorithm
except the change in key generation where the algorithm provides secret key for
issuer and secret key for opener with group public parameters, join procedure is
carried out by the issuer where the registration list is updated after every suc-
cessful join operation and the opening procedure where the new role i.e. opener
is responsible for opening the signature in case of any disputes. These can be
modified into the verifiable opening group signature by including the proof and
validity of proof in the opening procedure. An alternative approach would be to
require some third trusted party to generate both types of private keys in advance
and then hand the keys to the issuer and the opener respectively using secure
channels.
2.3 Literature review of Group signature schemes
2.3.1 Group Signature based on DLP
Chaum and Heyst introduced the group signature scheme based on DLP. In 1997,
Park, Kim and Won proposed an ID-based group signature [6]. The main contri-
bution of their scheme is that signer’s public key is identification (ID) that does
not need to be verified, so there is no need to set up a trusted center to verify a
huge number of public keys. Nevertheless, an ID-based group signature must use
a set of group member identities in the signing phase. When the group member
changes, the group signature is inactive and moreover the length of its signature
increases with the number of members.
16
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In 1998, Lee and Chang proposed an efficient group signature based on the
discrete logarithm[18]. The scheme was more efficient in terms of computational,
communication and storage costs, while allowing the group to be changed without
having the members choosing the new keys. However, when the signer has been
identified, the authority must redistribute the keys of this signer and send the keys
to him/her.
In 1999, Tseng and Jan aimed to improve the aforementioned problem to pro-
pose an improved group signature that is based on the Lee-Chang scheme[8]. In
the same year, Sun showed in that the Tseng-Jan scheme is still not unlinkable.
After that, Tseng-Jan [9] proposed to improve their scheme.
In 2000, Li et al.[2] demonstrated that two schemes of the Tseng-Sun’s paper,
which are called TJ1 and TJ2 in Li et al’s paper, both could be attacked. The
threshold group signature is an important kind of signature. Many threshold
group signatures are proposed but many suffered from conspiracy attack and are
insecure.
2.3.2 Group Signature with anonymity and separability
We have group signature based on strong separability Shundong Xia, where au-
thor proposed secure scheme based on discrete logarithm problem, such that group
manager can be split into membership manager and revocation manager. Previ-
ously proposed group signature scheme were not having identity with respect to
the public keys, thus requiring the manger to maintain data to map the identity
information. The scheme suggested that previous schemes may have weak form
of separability if proper communication is not available between revocation and
membership manager thus justifying strong separability.
In the paper Fucai Zhou, 2008 anonymity of signature was compared to the
group signature where they discussed an important problem, that is the signa-
tures are produced on behalf of group or group member and concluding that the
17
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signature should be produced on behalf of group and also pointed the conflict of
authenticated content[26].In 2009, a new improved group signature was introduced
by Cheng Lee et al. where the problem of unlinkability and unforgeability was
enhanced based on the discrete logarithm.
2.3.3 Group Signature based on Threshold Scheme
The group signature based on threshold scheme can be classified group oriented
(t, n) traceable signers and group oriented anonymous signers. The signature was
proven to be under forgery attack in paper proposed by Z.C. Li, 2001.Threshold
based signature was under revision by many authors and also being used in proxy
and blind signatures.
In the paper Yuan-Lung Yu, 2005 the author integrates the short secret key
characteristic of the elliptic curve cryptosystem and the (t, n) threshold method to
create a signature scheme with simultaneous signing. The distinguishing feature
of the proposed scheme is that the threshold value denotes the minimum number
of members required to produce a valid group signature. All message recipients
then can verify the signature. Many threshold group signature schemes have been
proposed, but most of them suffer from conspiracy attack and are insecure. In
this paper Fengyin Li, 2007, based on the discrete logarithm problem, a secure
threshold group signature scheme is proposed. The scheme is not only threshold-
signing, but also threshold-verifying.
In the paper, Fucai Zhou presented the requirement of real group signature
and gave a new scheme to realise a real group signature, which is based on pivot
threshold scheme[7].In 2011, Improvement of threshold group signature scheme
was introduced by Tong lu and Baoyuankang where the scheme proposes to be
more secure as providing the strong unforgeability based on discrete logarithm
problem.
18
2.4 Chapter Summary
2.3.4 Short Group Signature
The Group signature schemes are revised with respect to many security factors
where size of the signature was considered to be main issue by some authors as
compared to the complexities of signature generation schemes. In 2004 Dan Boneh
a short signature scheme was proposed where they gave a scheme that has approx-
imately the size of RSA signature standard with same security. The scheme was
based on bilinear groups with Strong Diffie Hellman assumptions (SDH).
Many schemes were developed that would be efficient and short in size but
considering the security of the signature in 2006, the author considered the formal
security model which has been proposed by Bellare, Shi and Zang, including both
dynamic groups,concurrent join and proposed extremely dynamic short signature
scheme with strong security under random oracle assumption[23]. The signature
scheme was based on strong Diffie Hellman assumptions (SDH) and external Diffie
Hellman assumptions.
Recently a paper on Short group signature with control linkability [(Jung Yeon
Hwang, Chung, Cho, & Nyang, 2011 aims at providing dynamic membership where
the controllable link ability enables an entity who possesses linking key to check if
two signatures are from the same signer while preserving anonymity. The scheme is
sufficiently efficient and well-suited for real-time applications even with restricted
resources, such as vehicular adhoc network and Trusted Platform Module at the
same time scheme supporting controllable link ability provides a signature that is
shorter than the standard normal group signature.
2.4 Chapter Summary
The review of group signature gives us the idea of enhancement of signature scheme
with various security features to be applicable in real time application, but due
to the complexities and active attacks analyzed, has failed the scheme to be fully
applicable. The most unpredictable attack is the colluding attack where the sig-
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nature schemes proposed, considers only the features that are predictable. Thus
reviewing the schemes proposed till now, we propose a new scheme that is centrally
based on avoiding the colluding attack.
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Group signature scheme resistant
against colluding attack
We propose a novel group signature scheme which provides full anonymity of
signer, full traceability of the signature, resistant to colluding attack and forgery
attack. A trusted third party (TTP) is an entity involved in the proposed scheme
who manages all critical communications among the group members and group
manager.
3.1 Proposed Scheme
The proposed group signature scheme consists of four participants namely, group
manager, group members, designated verifier, and trusted third party. The scheme
consisting of following five phases. The system model of proposed scheme is shown
in Figure 3.1.
3.1.1 Setup phase
Manager selects a prime p as public key which is large enough that the discrete
log problem is intractable in Zp∗ . He selects another public key q such that
(q − 1) = 0mod p and also chooses a random private key Y . Manager also
computes group key as gk = (y−1)δ , where the δ is a randomly chosen parameter.
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Figure 3.1: Layout of the proposed scheme
3.1.2 Join phase
Any member who wants to join the group gets registered through the certificate
authority and authority ensures the registration of member to the manager. Man-
ager computes the secret d for the member such that d = yαmod p where α is
randomly chosen by the group manager. Then the manager splits the secret key
d into two parts as d1 and d2 . The key division can be done through any method
which is appropriate to the manager. Here the manager has a flexibility to decide
the splitting method but one important concern regarding the splitting is that the
division should be lossless. The secret keys d and d1 are sent to each member in
encrypted form using the member′s public key. The key d2 is send to the trusted
third party (TTP) which manages keys of each member. Each member chooses a
primitive element e0 in zp , and computes e1 = e
p−1
q
0 mod p . The Member chooses
a secret key x and computes e2 = e
xd
1 mod p .
Members are organized according to a structure as shown in Figure 3.2. Here
we have two structures namely QA, QB which are divided into many slots with
respect to the member who will sign the document. Each member is assigned
with the binary counter (0/1), where 0 represents that the member is not signing
any document and 1 represents that the member is reserved with the signing
of document. We have members organized initially in QA and when a member
completes the signing of the document then the member is send to the QB similarly
a member completing signing of document or message in QB is send back to the
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QA. The trusted third party has database maintained for the member according
to the slot and structure defined.
Figure 3.2: Join phase of the proposed scheme
3.1.3 Signature generation phase
In this phase, a member Xi chooses a random number β from 1 to q and com-
putes the signature as:
s1 = h(M |eβ1 modP ) (3.1)
s2 = β + x× (id+ d2)× s1mod q (3.2)
Where M is the required message to be signed, h represents the hash for the
signature and id represents the slot id that maps the key from trusted third party
with the respective member. The parameter e1, e2 are encrypted using verifiers
public key and finally the message, signature with hash M, s1, s2 along with the
hash of key h(d2) encrypted via manager’s public key are finally encrypted using
group key and send to the verifier. The value of β will vary with respect to each
message.
3.1.4 Verification phase
The verifier gets the encrypted data which he decrypts using the group key and
verifier’s private key accordingly. And now computes the following to check the
validity of signature.
s′ = h(M |es21 × e−s12 mod p) (3.3)
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If the value of S ′ satisfies the following, s1 = S ′mod p ,then signature is accepted
otherwise rejected.
3.1.5 Open phase
The encrypted signature can be decrypted by manager with the group key and
can check the hash value that is encrypted with the manager’s key. As manager
has the key hashed with respect to each member so can say who has generated
the signature.
3.2 Chapter Summary
The above work shows the working principle of our proposed scheme .Since the
scheme should be efficient against active attacks, so we analyze the security and
performance of our scheme with respect to the standard group signature scheme
and proving that the proposed scheme is safe and secure against many active
attacks.
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Security Analysis of Proposed
Scheme
4.1 Security analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we analyze the security feature of the proposed scheme including
computational efficiency. Then we prove that the proposed scheme is resistant
against the colluding attack. Also, we proved that the proposed scheme satisfies
the unforgeability, anonymity, verifiability, and exculpability. Then we compared
the proposed scheme with some popular group signature schemes and found that
our scheme has less computation overhead. Also we proved that group signature
is independent of number of members in a group.
Correctness: The group signature s1, s2 for a message M is indeed a valid signa-
ture.
Proof: The correctness of group signature is given as follows.
S ′ = h(M |es21 .e−s12 mod p) (4.1)
S ′ = h(M |eβ+x(id+d2)s1mod q1 .e−s12 mod p) (4.2)
S ′ = h(M |eβ+x(id+d2)s1mod q1 .e−x.d.s1mod q2 mod p) (4.3)
S ′ = h(M |eβmod p) (4.4)
As the above signature is congruent, thus proofs the correctness of signature.
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In the following, we postulate some theorems regarding the basic security re-
quirements:
Theorem 1: It is impossible to determine the signer from two given signatures.
Proof: We have two signer’s signature with different message as M and N respec-
tively. The signature produced are based on discrete logarithm problem where we
have: {
M, s1, s2,
⌊
Mgpu(h(da))
⌋}
vkey{
N, f1, f2,
⌊
Mgpu(h(db))
⌋}
vkey
The above scheme surely follows unlinkability as the two signatures are encrypted
with verifier’s key and hash or message digest is further encrypted with manager’s
key if the encryption is compromised, then only signature can be viewed with
the digest encrypted with manager’s key which will also be needed to link, thus
complexity of scheme involved would reveal nothing about the signer.
Theorem 2: It is impossible for any non group member to forge a valid signature
s1, s2 produced by the proposed scheme.
Proof: To forge a signature of message M, the adversary must know the secret of
group member to sign the message, which is surely secure with respect to the DLP
assumption. Another secret is the group key which is known to group members
and the verifier which makes it more secure to be forged. If forger intercepts a
message M and its two signature s1, s2 , he can find another message M
′ , with
the same pair of signature M ′ , but this would not benefit the forger much as the
scheme is in better position because
s1 = h(M |eβ1mod p)
which means that the hash function is applied to the combination of message and
parameter which is secret and varying. The above forging is only possible if the
signature are obtained but these are already encrypted and the secret is known to
member only so it is difficult to forge and it also requires computing the discrete
logarithm, which is very difficult.
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Theorem 3: No one other than the group manager can link a signature to a group
member to sign it.
Proof: The key is provided by the manager which is one way hashed with the
signature encrypted by the manager’s key
⌊
Mgpu(h(da))
⌋
which allows only man-
ager to know the identity and even if the encryption is compromised, revealing
the digest would not affect as the data is hashed which difficult for any adver-
sary to know the signer’s identity. The value obtained would be irrelevant for the
non-group member thus providing anonymous group signature.
Theorem 4: The group signature remains unaffected even if the group member
leaves or joins the group.
Proof: The above scheme is surely unaffected if member leaves or joins the group,
as the manager provides the secret key which is independent of number of member
in a group and the group key computed is based on discrete logarithm assumption
which is independent of number of group member, gk = (y − 1)δ so if a member
leaves manger has to simply remove the key from list and ensure the same to
trusted third party(TTP) and similarly if a new member joins, then secret is
generated and TTP is ensured about the joining of the member in the group.
Theorem 5: No one other than the designated verifier can verify the signature.
Proof: The signature generated by the members are verified by the designated
verifier as the verifier is registered from the certificate authority where the verifier is
the only member to check the integrity of the signature as the signature parameter
are encrypted via verifier’s key which can be known by the verifier only.
Theorem 6: No set of group member can forge a valid signature.
Proof: Since the signature procedure for members are done in particular structure
defined where members are organized with respect to the slot-id and each member
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is assigned a binary counter, managed by trusted third party only. The security
of scheme can be well understood in the cases that are discussed below. The
management of member signing the document can be considered under following
cases:
CASE 1: Initially all the member are arranged in a structure QA or QB de-
pending on the choice of the trusted third party.
Here the member will be arranged into slots where each slot consist of slot id
provided by the trusted third party. Now if any member is signing the document,
then counter assigned to the slot are changed from 0 to 1 until signing of document
is completed and the member is send to the other structure with the initial values
reassigned to avoid collusion.
CASE 2: If the member try to sign a document using other member’s key.
In this case if a member signs a document using other member’s key, which will
not be practically possible as the trusted third party has the database maintained
for each member where the member key is not enough to, sign the document as
trusted third party’s key is also required which resist the collusion.
CASE 3: The members are changed after regular interval according to the trusted
third party (TTP).
The TTP varies the member slot with respect to the slot id after regular interval
providing randomness in the procedure of signing the document.
CASE 4: Even the group manager or verifier is not aware of the trusted third
party management.
Here the manager’s job is completed after assigning the key to the trusted third
party and after there is no interaction and similarly the verifier is only concerned
with verifying the document, providing transparency in the whole system of signing
the document. Thus structure management is done by the trusted third party.
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Now if the member colludes then they can produce a valid signature but in this
case since they follow an organized structure which makes it impossible for the
manager or the members to produce a valid signature i.e., if the member knows a
secret of other member he cannot produce the signature as the structure provides a
secret that is mapped at the time of signature, so makes it impossible for member
to collude.Even the non-group member who knows the secret cannot forge the
signature as each member is mapped with the slots provided that are mapped by
trusted third party thus avoiding the coalition in the signature generation.
4.2 Performance analysis of the proposed scheme
The complexity of any signature scheme mostly depends on four operations, namely,
exponentiation, multiplication, inverse operation and hash functions. So we com-
pare well-known group signature schemes. The result of the comparison is shown
in Table. In this evaluation, the time for performing modular addition and sub-
traction operations are ignored.
The following notations are used to analyze the performance of the schemes.
TE is the computation time requirement for modular exponentiation.
TM is the computation time requirement for modular multiplication.
TI is the computation time requirement for modular inverse operation.
TH is the computation time requirement for performing hash functions.
Table 4.1: Performance comparison
Phases Kim’s Lee and Chang’s J. Zhang’s Proposed
Scheme[6] Scheme[18] Scheme[4] Scheme
Signature 3TE + 4TM 6TE + 5TM 4TE + 5TM 2TE + TM
generation +TH +TH +TH
Signature 3TE + 3TM 5TE + 4TM 4TE + 2TM 2TE + TM
verification +TH +2TH +TI + TH
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It is observed from table that, the computational cost of above the group signature
generation and verification phase of the proposed scheme is considerably lower than
the existing schemes. In the signature generation phase of the proposed scheme,
one inverse operation is used. The proposed scheme is secure and. So, if security
is the utmost priority, then the proposed scheme will be more advantageous.
4.3 Chapter Summary
The proposed group signature scheme has being analyzed with respect security
requirement which shows the correctness of the proposed scheme and the perfor-
mance analysis shows that the scheme is efficient and effective with respect to the
security of message integrity. Our proposed scheme has being implemented under
certain assumption with various phases described above of the group signature
which is shown in next chapter.
32
Implementation and Results
Chapter 5
Implementation and Results
5.1 Implementation
The implementation of proposed scheme is done using Java platform and Mysql
as database for storing the key parameters. The proposed scheme implemented
in Java Big integer values, where the Crypto and Security package are used for
generating the secret key parameters for members and the hash function algorithm
for signature generation phase. The random prime number generation is done
using the Util package of Java. Here we have ten members in a group and the key
parameter of size 512 bits and is supported by standard hardware configuration
with 100 GB of hard disk and Ram size of 2 GB in windows platform system.The
implementation consists of following steps in proposed scheme:
 Setup phase
 Join phase
 Signature generation phase
 Verify phase
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Figure 5.1: Setup phase of the proposed scheme
Proposed Group signature Scheme:
Setup Phase: (Computation done using Big Integer values)
Manager selects the prime number p = 11
Another parameter computed q = 2
Manager selects a random secret and computes the Group key gk = 7
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Figure 5.2: Join phase of the proposed scheme
Join phase:
Key generation of member[i]:
Key of member[i] —————15722562090536181149
Secret key of member ————8
Manager divides the key:
d———8
d2——–3
d1——–11
The key d and d2 send to member and d1 send to the trusted third party.
Member[i] parameter computation:
Member[i] calculates e1———14270951998287218291
Member[i] calculates e2——–17567
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Figure 5.3: Signature generation and verification phase of the proposed scheme
Signature generation and verification:
Member[i] generates the signature on message:
Message−− >hello this is confidential
Signature parameters computed:
S1 signature computed−−−−−− > as83bd9b367e6a39d9dc345des47t7ad306342151de9
S2 signature computed−−−−−−− > 1523
Signature sent to the verifier with (message, S1, S2)
Verification Initiated−− >member[i] (message S1, S2)
Output of verifier
hello this is confidential
as83bd9b367e6a39d9dc345des47t7ad306342151de9 (verified)
Verification Finished.
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Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed group signature scheme is secure scheme based on discrete logarithm
problem assumption. The proposed scheme is proved to be resistant against col-
luding attack such that neither the group manager nor any set of group member
can produce a valid signature of a message on behalf of a group member.
The proposed scheme satisfies standard security features like anonymity, unforge-
ability, and unlinkability. The proposed scheme is member independent such that
any member leaving or joining would not affect the signature generation scheme.
The size of signature is still needed to be considered. Though the cost of signature
verification is more as compared to other standard signature scheme but on the
security aspect this would be efficient scheme where this scheme is very much safe
against many active attacks can be very much useful in an organization, where
the group manager can be equivalent to the chief executive officer, the signers can
be employees of the organization and the verifier may be a specific customer. This
scheme can also be applicable in e-voting system, e-cash system and e-commerce
applications.
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